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BACK TO BASICS: HARMONIZING DELAWARE’S LAW
GOVERNING GOING PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS©
Clark W. Furlow*

I. INTRODUCTION
Under Delaware law, there are two primary means by which a
controlling stockholder can eliminate the non-controlling stockholders
from the corporate enterprise.1 The first is a long-form merger (a
“going-private merger”) accomplished under section 251 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”).2 The second is a twostep process. In the first step, the controlling stockholder makes a tender
offer for enough shares to bring its holdings up to at least 90% of the
company’s stock (a “going-private tender offer”).3 In the second step,
the controlling stockholder effectuates a short-form merger under section
253 of the DGCL to eliminate the remaining stockholders.4
Each path leads to the same result – the elimination of the noncontrolling stockholders – but the Delaware Courts judge them under
different legal standards. The going-private merger is reviewed by the
exacting requirements of the “entire fairness” standard in which the
controlling stockholder bears the burden of proving that the transaction
was accomplished through “fair dealing” and at a “fair price.”5 The twostep process, on the other hand, allows the controlling stockholder to
© All rights reserved.
*

Clark W. Furlow is an Assistant Professor of Law at Stetson University College of Law. He may
be contacted at: furlow@law.stetson.edu. The author wishes to thank the Honorable Andrew G. T.
Moore, II, Justice, retired, Delaware Supreme Court for his thoughtful and helpful criticisms and
comments.
1. The elimination of the unaffiliated stockholders is a way the controlling stockholder can
“extract [private] benefit[]” from the company. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 787 (2003).
2. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2006).
3. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (2006).
4. Id.
5. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703, 711 (Del. 1983).
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avoid the burden of proving either fair price or fair dealing because the
going-private tender offer is not required to be made at a fair price,6 and
the short-form merger (which is accomplished unilaterally by the
controlling stockholder) does not require “fair dealing.”7
Commentators8 and Delaware’s Court of Chancery9 have called on
the Delaware Supreme Court to eliminate the disparate treatment given
to these functionally identical transactions. Some commentators argue
that because both types of transactions involve the elimination of noncontrolling stockholders in a transaction initiated by the controlling
stockholder, they should be judged under the entire fairness standard of
review.10 Other commentators criticize this argument because it would
increase the litigation costs attendant to going-private transactions.11
Even a frivolous claim brought under the entire fairness standard cannot
be disposed of without a trial, and the trial of such claims is invariably
complex and expensive. This article also rejects this approach because it
does not give full effect to Delaware law governing controlling
stockholders in other types of transactions or to Delaware’s public policy
requiring judges to defer to decisions made in good faith by independent
6. Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 39-40 (Del. 1996) (holding that a
majority stockholder has no duty to offer a fair price in a tender offer for the minority shares); In re
Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *6, *15 (Del. Ch. June 19,
2001) (finding that the same principle applies where the tender offer is the first step in a two-step
squeeze-out); In re Pure Res, Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002) (defining
terms a tender offer must include to avoid being coercive).
7. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 247-48 (Del. 2001). Moreover, the
adequacy of the merger price is subject to challenge only in a statutory appraisal action “only if
stockholders’ complaints are limited to ‘judgmental factors of valuation.’” Id. at 247; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 262.
8. See generally Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 Yale L.J. 2, 2 (2005); Bradley
R. Aronstam, R. Franklin Balotti & Timo Rehbock, Revisiting Delaware’s Going-Private Dilemma
– Post Pure Resources, 59 BUS. LAW. 1459, 1459-60 (2004); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at
833; Brian M. Resnick, Note, Recent Delaware Decisions May Prove To Be “Entirely Unfair” to
Minority Shareholders in Parent Merger with Partially Owned Subsidiary, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 253, 279-82 (2003). Other commentators defend the current state of Delaware law. Jon E.
Abramczyk et al, Going-Private “Dilemma”?–Not in Delaware, 58 BUS. LAW. 1351, 1353 (2003);
A. C. Pritchard, Tender Offers by Controlling Shareholders: The Specter of Coercion and Fair
Price, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 83, 84-85 (2004).
9. See In re Cox Commc’ns S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 642-49 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re
Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 435.
10. Ely R. Levy, Freeze-out Transactions the Pure Way: Reconciling Judicial Asymmetry
Between Tender Offers and Negotiated Mergers, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 347-48 (2004); Kimble
Charles Cannon, Augmenting the Duties of Directors to Protect Minority Shareholders in the
Context of Going-Private Transactions:The Case for Obligating Directors to Express a Valuation
Opinion in Unilateral Tender Offers After Siliconix, Aquila and Pure Resources, 2003 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 191, 240-43 (2003); Resnick, supra note 8, at 279.
11. Subramanian, supra note 8, at 23.
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corporate decision-makers.
Other commentators,12 joined by one of the sitting Vice
Chancellors,13 have urged a change in the law governing both types of
transactions.
Under this “hybrid approach,”14 a going-private
transaction, whether a merger or a tender offer, approved by independent
decision-makers would be subject to the business judgment rule, but in
the absence of such independent approval the transaction would be
subject to the entire fairness standard of review.15 The hybrid approach
uses these different judicial standards of review to create incentives for
transactional planners to structure going-private transactions so that
price is determined through arm’s-length negotiation.16 To accomplish
this, the hybrid approach would have the Delaware Court of Chancery
create new rules governing going-private transactions.17 But, this
answer neglects to take into account the fact that the Court of Chancery
is a court of equity, not a legislative body. Its job is to apply the
common law of equity as it relates to the fiduciary duties of corporate
controllers, not to make rules.
This Article agrees with the objectives of the hybrid approach, but
argues that a more doctrinally consistent way to achieve that result
would be to shift the analytical focus from the duties of the controlling
stockholder to the duties of the corporation’s board. The Article will
show that the Delaware Supreme Court’s focus on the duties of
controlling stockholders in going-private transactions and its resistance
to applying traditional modes of analysis to decisions by independent,
disinterested directors has led to the current “incoherence”18 of
Delaware’s going-private jurisprudence. Moreover, under the approach
urged by the Court of Chancery in the Pure Resources decision19 that
same focus threatens to lead to a confusing, transactionally specific
12. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 838-39; and Subramanian, supra note 8, at 55-62.
13. In Pure Resources, Vice Chancellor Strine created new rules governing going-private
tender offers. In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 444-45 (Del. Ch. 2002). In dictum of his Cox
Communications opinion, Vice Chancellor Strine called for a modification of Kahn v. Lynch
Communication System, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). In re Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 606-07
(Del. Ch. 2005). The Vice Chancellor’s approach is largely consistent with that proposed by
Subramanian in Fixing Freezeouts, supra note 8, and the Vice Chancellor cites a working draft of
Subramanian’s paper in In re Cox Communications, 879 A.2d 604 passim.
14. This phrase is used in Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 838, and Subramanian, supra
note 8, at 29.
15. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 839.
16. See id. at 839-40.
17. See id. at 842-43.
18. In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 435.
19. Id. at 445.
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patchwork of duties for controlling stockholders.
This Article, supported by a number of decisions decided by the
Court of Chancery during the summer of 2006, shows that by shifting
the analytical focus to the board and by applying traditional principles
for the review of business judgments, the standards by which these two
types of going-private transactions are judged can be brought into
harmony with one another and with the rest of Delaware law. The aim
of encouraging arm’s-length negotiation in going private transactions
would be served because, under traditional principles, only a transaction
negotiated at arm’s-length and approved by independent corporate
decision-makers is entitled to protection under the business judgment
rule.
A. Going-Private Mergers
Under existing Delaware law, when a controlling stockholder
causes its company to engage in a going-private merger, the courts apply
the entire fairness standard ab initio,20 because the controlling
stockholder is deemed to control “both sides of the transaction.”21 This
simple phrase ignores an important fact. The controlling stockholder has
direct control over the “buy” side, but it does not have direct control
over the “sell” side. In a merger, the “seller” is the corporation, and the
corporation is controlled by its board of directors.22 In particular, a
corporation cannot enter into a going-private merger unless its board
votes to approve the transaction.23 Thus, for a controlling stockholder to
be in control of the “sell” side of the transaction, it must be able to
control the board of directors.24 It follows that the Delaware courts’
application of the entire fairness standard ab initio amounts to a
presumption that the independence of the board is corrupted by the
presence of a controlling stockholder. The courts follow this practice
even when a majority of the company’s directors would be deemed
independent under traditional modes of analysis.25 In this respect the
law governing going-private mergers stands at odds with the business
20. Orman v. Cullman (Cullman I), 794 A.2d 5, 20 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“Usually the entire
fairness standard only applies at the outset (‘ab initio’) in certain special circumstances, viz, a
squeeze out merger between two companies under the control of a controlling shareholder.”).
21. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952).
22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006).
23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (2006).
24. Stated differently, the controlling stockholder must have corrupted the independence of
the directors so that they base their decisions on the best interests of the controlling stockholder
rather than those of the company.
25. In re Cysive Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 547-48 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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judgment rule and with Delaware’s “safe harbor” statute for interested
transactions. 26
In Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc.27 the court held
that the entire fairness standard of review would apply even where the
company neutralizes the controlling stockholder’s presumed control over
the board by appointing a committee of independent, disinterested
directors to determine whether the proposed going-private merger would
be fair to the non-controlling stockholders.28 The Lynch court refused to
defer to the business judgment of the independent committee because it
was concerned that even apparently independent directors might be
subtly influenced by the expressed (or supposed) desires of a powerful
controlling stockholder.29 Lynch’s only deference to the committee’s
decision to approve such a transaction was to shift the burden of proof so
that the plaintiff would be required to prove that the squeeze-out merger
was not entirely fair.30 By retaining the entire fairness standard, the
Lynch decision permitted judges to look past procedural protections and
make their own substantive review of the fairness of the squeeze-out
merger.
This Article argues that by appointing a special committee of
independent directors, a majority stockholder removes itself from the
other side of the transaction. Accordingly, the jurisprudential foundation
for the imposition of a duty of entire fairness is eliminated. The majority
stockholder is not, as a matter of fact, on both sides of the transaction.
When the majority stockholder is no longer able to influence the board’s
decision (made through the special committee) the courts should follow
the traditional practice of reviewing the board’s decision under the
business judgment rule. Pursuant to the procedural aspects of the
business judgment rule, the burden would be on the plaintiff to prove
particularized facts giving reason to question the committee’s
independence, power, diligence, or good faith. If the plaintiff fails to
plead such facts, the claim would be subject to a motion to dismiss. On
the other hand, if the plaintiff pleads facts that give reason to believe that
the committee was lacking in independence or power, it would follow
26. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2006); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (defining business judgment rule as
the “presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company”); see also infra note 81 (defining safe harbor).
27. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
28. Id. at 1117.
29. Id. at 1116-17.
30. Id. at 1117.
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that the controlling stockholder had failed to remove itself from its
presumed place on the other side of the transaction, and under traditional
principles, the controlling stockholder (and the directors whose
independence it presumably compromised) would be required to satisfy
the entire fairness standard of review. 31
B. Going-Private Tender Offers
Under current Delaware law, going-private tender offers are not
reviewed under the entire fairness standard because the controlling
stockholder is not deemed to stand on both sides of the tender offer.32 In
this context, as with going-private merger, the controlling stockholder is
on the “buy” side. But, unlike the going-private merger, the controlling
stockholder is not able to control the “sell” side. The sellers are the
individual non-controlling stockholders, not the corporation. For this
reason, the courts conclude that the entire fairness standard does not
apply, and thus, the controlling stockholder does not have a duty to offer
a fair price.33
Despite the fact that the controlling stockholder is not viewed as
straddling both sides of the tender offer and thus would not be in
fiduciary position with regard to the tender offer, the Court of Chancery
in Pure Resources Stockholder Litigation created a new fiduciary duty
that requires a controlling stockholder to include certain judicially
mandated terms in its tender offer for non-controlling shares to prevent
the offer from being deemed coercive.34
This article argues that the Pure Resources decision exceeds the
traditional bounds of equity jurisprudence, imposing a duty where the
factual foundation for such a duty does not exist. The more doctrinally
consistent approach to this problem would be to focus on the fiduciary
duties of the board of directors. Although the corporation is not a formal
party to a tender offer and plays no statutory role in the transaction, the
common law defining the board’s fiduciary duties imposes on the board
a “fundamental duty and obligation” to protect the company’s
stockholders from tender offers that threaten their interests. 35 The board
31. If the plaintiff pleads facts that give reason to doubt that the members of the committee
satisfied their duties of care, the committee would bear the burden of proving the entire fairness of
the transaction.
32. See In re Aquila, Inc., 805 A.2d 184, 190 (Del. Ch. 2002).
33. In re Siliconix Inc. S’holder Litig., No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, *5-*6 (Del. Ch.
2001).
34. In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002).
35. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953-54 (Del. 1985).
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meets this duty to function as the agent for the disaggregated
stockholders by taking such action in response to the tender offer as may
be required to protect them from a bad deal and attempt to negotiate a
better one.36 This Article argues that these duties, first articulated in the
context of hostile third-party offers, apply with equal force in the context
of a going-private tender offer by a controlling stockholder.
When the focus is shifted to the board, the crucial question becomes
this: Was the board in a position to exercise its independent judgment as
to the fairness of the going-private tender offer and to negotiate on
behalf of, and protect the interests of, the non-controlling stockholders?
This Article argues that the power to prevent a board from saying
“no” to a going-private tender offer is just as effective as the power to
cause a board to say “yes” to a going-private merger. Thus, when a
controlling stockholder takes no steps to neutralize its presumed control
over the board, the courts should presume that the controlling
stockholder was able to influence, however subtly, the only agent
charged with responsibility for protecting the non-controlling
stockholders. For this reason, the controlling stockholder should be
deemed to have placed itself “on the other side of the transaction” and
the entire fairness standard should apply. As a self-interested fiduciary,
the controlling stockholder would have a duty to make the tender offer
entirely fair to the unaffiliated stockholders.
But, if the corporation creates a special committee of independent
directors and empowers that committee to respond to the tender offer in
a way that serves the best interests of the non-controlling stockholders,
the controlling stockholder should be deemed to have removed itself
from the other side of the transaction. Once again, the jurisprudential
foundation for the imposition of a duty of entire fairness would be
eliminated because the majority stockholder would not, as a matter of
fact, be able to neutralize the ability of the board to defend the
unaffiliated stockholders. As with other tender offer situations, if the
committee accepts the proposed tender offer, its decision would be
subject to review under the procedural and substantive aspects of the
business judgment rule. But, if the committee were to take defensive
action to block the tender offer, its decision would be subject to review
under the Unocal standard of review.37
36. In re Pure Res., Inc, 808 A.2d at 445.
37. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
The court determined that the board was entitled to the benefits of the business judgment
rule as general matter but that, because the board faced the inherent conflict of being
eliminated if the transaction succeeded, it would be required to show reasonable grounds
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C. Harmonizing the Standards of Review for Going-Private
Transactions
By focusing on the board rather than on the controlling stockholder,
the standard of review for these two types of squeeze-out transactions
can be harmonized with one another and with other areas of Delaware
common law governing fiduciary duties.
Where a controlling
stockholder chooses not to create an independent committee to
neutralize its presumed power over the board, the presumption that the
controlling stockholder is on both sides of the transaction should remain
in effect and the entire fairness standard should be applied. This
approach would apply equally in the context of a going-private merger
and a going-private tender offer. On the other hand, where the board
creates a special committee of independent directors to neutralize the
controlling stockholder’s presumed power over the board, the committee
should be entitled to the favorable presumptions of the business
judgment rule. This approach would serve the policy favoring the
making of business judgments in boardrooms rather than courtrooms.
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, it describes the
current approach to reviewing going-private mergers, criticizes that
approach, and proposes changes to make the review of going-private
mergers consistent with other areas of Delaware law. Part II describes
the current approach to going-private tender offers, criticizes that
approach, and proposes changes that will bring this area into harmony
with going-private mergers. Part III, the conclusion, explains how this
harmonized approach to functionally identical transactions will improve
the welfare of unaffiliated stockholders.
II. GOING PRIVATE MERGERS AND ENTIRE FAIRNESS
Delaware law has long held that a fiduciary who engages in selfdealing must prove that the transaction is entirely fair to the entity to
which it owes its fiduciary duty.38 The entire fairness standard of review
subjects a challenged transaction to the most demanding form of review
used by the Delaware courts.39 The Delaware Supreme Court expresses
it this way: “The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand
for its determination that a risk of harm existed with respect to the company and that its
response to this risk was proportional.
Cannon, supra note 10, at 228.
38. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem.
Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58 (Del. 1952).
39. Gilson and Gordon, supra note 1, at 791 (2003).
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that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of
establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful
scrutiny by the courts.”40
Generally, a stockholder who exercises control over a corporation is
subject to this duty of entire fairness41 when it exercises its power to
cause the corporation to enter into a transaction from which the
controlling stockholder stands to profit at the expense of the noncontrolling stockholders.42 A “going-private merger”43 is a type of selfdealing transaction because the controlling stockholder “stand[s] on both
sides of the transaction.”44
A. Both Sides of the Merger
The statement that a controlling stockholder “stands on both sides”
of a going-private merger glosses over important details of corporate
governance. Clearly, the controlling stockholder stands on the “buy”
side of the merger because it proposed the merger, and at the end of the
process it acquires the exclusive ownership of the corporation. But, the
controlling stockholder does not have clear control of the “sell” side.
The corporation, not the controlling stockholder, stands on the
“sell” side. Here is where the simplicity of the idea that a controlling
stockholder straddles both sides of the transaction becomes misleading.
Under Delaware law, a corporation must follow a two step process to
effectuate a merger.45 First, the merger must be approved by the
40. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710.
41. The Delaware Courts, typically, do not define a controlling stockholder’s fiduciary duty
with the same precision as they define the fiduciary duties of directors. A controlling stockholder is
not said to have a duty of loyalty, or care, or good faith. Tanzer v. Int’l General Indus., Inc., 379
A.2d 1121, 1124 (Del. 1977), overruled on other grounds by Weinberger, 457 A.2d 701. Rather, in
the self-dealing context, the courts merely invoke the existence of the duty and require the
controlling stockholder to prove that the transaction is entirely fair. Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels,
Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594-95 (Del. Ch. 1986). For this reason, this article will refer to the fiduciary
duty of controlling stockholders as the duty of entire fairness.
42. Jedwab, 509 A.2d at 594-95.
43. This article uses the phrase, “going-private merger,” to refer to long-form merger under
title 8, section 151 of the Delaware Code, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (2006), between a
corporation and a corporate stockholder with a large block of the corporation’s stock in which the
corporate stockholder acquires exclusive ownership of the corporation. In a going-private merger
the shares of the corporation held by persons not affiliated with the large stockholder (the
“unaffiliated stockholders”) are canceled, and in exchange, the unaffiliated stockholders receive
cash, stock, or debt. See, e.g., Weinberger, 457 A.2d 701. Because their shares have been cancelled,
they are no longer stockholders – they have been “squeezed-out,” and the corporation is now
privately held by the large stockholder. See id.
44. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Del. 1952).
45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2006).
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corporation’s board of directors,46 and second, it must be approved by an
absolute majority of the corporation’s stockholders.47 A majority
stockholder clearly has the voting power to assure stockholder approval.
But, stockholder approval, standing alone, is not enough to commit the
corporation to the merger.48 The board must take the first step. It must
negotiate the merger, approve the merger agreement, and submit it to the
stockholders for their vote.49 To control the corporation’s side of the
transaction, the stockholder must be able to influence at least a majority
of the directors as the board proceeds through the first step of the merger
process.50
1. Controlling vs. Powerful Stockholder
The ability to exercise practical control over a majority of the board
is what makes a stockholder a “controlling stockholder.”51 But, under
Delaware law, the analysis of the question whether a stockholder is a
“controlling stockholder” begins not with its ability to influence a
majority of the directors; rather, it begins with the size of its
stockholdings. Size matters. A stockholder that owns more that 50% of
a company’s shares is automatically and conclusively presumed to be a
“controlling stockholder.”52 Thus, a majority stockholder is presumed to
be on both sides of the transaction. On the other hand, a stockholder that
owns a large but less than majority block of the corporation’s shares is

46. Id. § 251(b).
47. Id. § 251(c).
48. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Mechanisms of Control, 13 CONN. J. INT’L L. 233, 236
(1999) (“Holding a majority of voting power does not in itself place a shareholder in a position of
active control. If the shareholder assumes no additional role within the corporation, the shareholder
is not a direct participant in operational decisions or in the formulation of strategic policy.”).
Moreover, the exercise of the majority stockholder’s voting power is not the source of its fiduciary
duty of entire fairness because a majority stockholder is free to vote its shares in its self-interest free
of any fiduciary duty to the minority stockholders. See Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436,
442-43 n.9 (Del. 1996); see also Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987);
Orman v. Cullman (Cullman II), No. Civ.A. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395, at *5 (Del. Ch. 2004); Peter
Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Shaw, No. Civ.A. 20087-NC, 2003 WL 21649926, at *1 (Del. Ch.
July 10, 2003), aff’d mem., 840 A.2d 642 (Del. 2003); Omnicare v NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d
914, 938 (Del. 2003).
49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b), (c).
50. As a matter of statutory law, the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are
controlled by its board of directors; not its stockholders. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2006);
Cullman I, 794 A.2d 5, 19 (Del. Ch. 2002) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del.
1984) overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)).
51. In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 553 (Del. Ch. 2003).
52. See In re W. Nat’l Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 15927, 2000 WL 710192 at *1 (Del. Ch.
May 22, 2000).
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not presumed to be a controlling stockholder.53 In that situation, the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the large stockholder is, in fact, a
controlling stockholder and thus subject to a fiduciary duty of entire
fairness.54
The use of the term “controlling stockholder” to define a category
that includes majority stockholders and large stockholders who exercise
control over the corporation is imprecise. A majority stockholder is
always powerful, but it may not use that power to exercise control over
the members of the corporation’s board. And even a large stockholder
that customarily exercises control over a corporation may relinquish that
control for purposes of the specific transaction that is the subject of
judicial review.55 Thus, the broad use of the phrase “controlling
stockholder” assumes the existence of control when, in fact, control may
not exist.
In the interest of clarity, this Article will use the term “powerful
stockholder” to refer collectively to majority stockholders and to
stockholders whose holdings are large enough to give them clout.56 The
term “controlling stockholder” will be used to refer to a powerful
stockholder that actually uses that power to exercise control over the
board with respect to the challenged transaction.57 Thus, by this
definition, a majority stockholder that does not control the board of
directors or a large stockholder that has relinquished its customary
control with respect to the challenged transaction would not be a
“controlling stockholder.”
2. Going-Private Mergers
The early going-private merger cases all involved majority
stockholders who clearly dominated and controlled the boards of their
subsidiary corporations. For example, in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp.,58 the first Delaware case to deal with a going private merger, a
majority of the members of the board that approved the merger were
53. Weinstein Enters., Inc. v. Orloff, 870 A.2d 499, 507 (Del. 2005).
54. In re W. Nat’l, 2000 WL 710192 at *6. By exercising control over the corporation with
respect to a self-interested transaction, the large stockholder takes on a fiduciary duty to the other
stockholders to make sure the transaction is entirely fair. Weinstein Enterprises, 870 A.2d at 507.
55. See In re Sea-Land Corp. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No 8453, 1988 WL 49126, at *3 (Del.
Ch. 1988).
56. Where a corporation has a “powerful stockholder” this Article will use the term
“unaffiliated stockholders” to refer to the stockholders not affiliated with the powerful stockholder.
57. Where a corporation has a “controlling stockholder” this Article will use the term “noncontrolling stockholders” to refer to the other stockholders.
58. 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952).
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employed as officers or served as directors of the majority stockholder.59
For this reason, the court concluded that the majority stockholder and the
directors who were under its control “occupy, in relation to the minority,
a fiduciary position in dealing with [the corporation’s] property. Since
they stand on both sides of the transaction, they bear the burden of
establishing its entire fairness, and it must pass the test of careful
scrutiny by the courts.”60
In modern times, what had been a finding of fact, the domination of
directors by the majority stockholder, has evolved into a conclusion of
law. This evolution began with Singer v. Magnavox Co.,61 where the
Delaware Supreme Court said: “It is a settled rule of law in
Delaware . . .” that a “majority stockholder . . . owe[s] to the minority
stockholders . . . a fiduciary obligation in dealing with the latter’s
property.”62 The court continued: It is “established law in this State that
the dominant corporation, as a majority stockholder standing on both
sides of a merger transaction, has ‘the burden of establishing its entire
fairness’ to the minority stockholders sufficiently to ‘pass the test of
careful scrutiny by the courts.’”63
Thus, the application of the entire fairness standard to review a
going-private merger no longer required a finding that the majority
stockholder had exercised control over the subsidiary corporation.64
Rather the exercise of control was assumed and the entire fairness
standard was imposed as a matter of law.65
59. In Sterling, a majority of the board was made up of individuals who also served as officers
or directors of the majority stockholder. Id. at 109.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d 701 (Del.
1983). The Singer case held that a majority stockholder had a fiduciary duty to the minority
stockholders that would prevent the majority stockholder from effectuating a going-private merger
unless it could prove that the merger was being accomplished for a valid business purpose. Id. at
979-80. A going-private merger could not be accomplished for the sole purpose of eliminating the
minority stockholders. Id. Notably, in Singer, the fiduciary duty was linked to the majority
stockholder’s motive in executing the merger. See id.
62. Id at 976. (emphasis added) (citing Sterling, 93 A.2d at 109-10).
63. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Sterling, 93 A.2d at 110).
64. For example, in Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc., the court did not even
consider the composition of the subsidiary’s board. 379 A.2d 1121, 1123-24 (Del. 1977), overruled
on other grounds by Weinberger, 457 A.2d 701. Rather, the opinion simply assumes (without so
stating) that the parent corporation controlled the board. See id. The decision focuses not on the
parent corporation’s “director control” over the subsidiary “which is a consequence of its power”
but on the parent’s right to vote its shares in accordance with its self-interest. Id. at 1123. The court
declines the defendant’s invitation to consider the business judgment rule saying that the business
judgment rule “is not the measure of [parent corporation’s] responsibility to minority shareholders
in its subsidiary.” Id. at 1124.
65. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 96 (Del. 2001) (Emerald Partners III).
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In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.66 the Delaware Supreme Court
overruled Singer’s business purpose test.67 Weinberger seemed to signal
a return to the practice of examining the relationship between the
corporation’s board of directors and its majority stockholder. It cited the
Mayflower Hotel case, among others, for the proposition that the entire
fairness standard would apply where the same individuals served as
directors of the parent corporation and the subsidiary corporation.68 The
court reasoned that these directors’ divided loyalties created a question
of breach of fiduciary duty.69 In the Weinberger case, two of these
directors used information that belonged to the subsidiary corporation to
help the parent corporation price the going-private merger and failed to
disclose this fact to their fellow board members.70 For these reasons, the
court held that they and the majority stockholder would have to prove
that the merger had been entirely fair to the minority stockholders.71
Weinberger also refined the analysis of the “entire fairness”
standard, explaining that the standard required (1) that the stockholders
receive a “fair price” for their shares and (2) that the transaction be the
product of “fair dealing.”72 “Fair price” would be determined by the
standards applicable to a statutory appraisal action.73 “Fair dealing”
would include, among other things,74 the use of a process that replicates
negotiations in an arm’s-length transaction75 and the disclosure of
66. 457 A.2d 701.
67. Id. at 715.
68. Id. at 710-11.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 708-09.
71. Id. at 710.
72. Id. at 711.
73. Id. at 712-13. The court also liberalized the standards by which Delaware courts could
determine the value of a corporation, holding that value could be proved “by any techniques or
methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise
admissible in court.” Id. at 713. “Only the speculative elements of value that may arise from the
‘accomplishment or expectation’ of the merger are excluded.” Id.
74. Fair dealing also includes issues related to the timing of the transaction and the way the
transaction is presented to the subsidiary corporation. Id. at 711.
75. Id. at 709, n. 7. The court said:
Although perfection is not possible, or expected, the result here could have been entirely
different if [the subsidiary corporation] had appointed an independent negotiating
committee of its outside directors to deal with [the parent corporation] at arm’s length.
Since fairness in this context can be equated to conduct by a theoretical, wholly
independent, board of directors acting upon the matter before them, it is unfortunate that
this course apparently was neither considered nor pursued. Particularly in a parentsubsidiary context, a showing that the action taken was as though each of the contending
parties had in fact exerted its bargaining power against the other at arm’s length is strong
evidence that the transaction meets the test of fairness.
Id. at 709-10, n.7 (citations omitted). See Gilson and Gordon, supra note 1, at 798 (2003).
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material information to the unaffiliated stockholders.76
The replication of arm’s-length negotiations requires that the parent
corporation be separated from control over the decision-making process
of the subsidiary’s board by creating a special committee of independent
directors with the power to reject the parent’s merger proposal.77 Under
common law fiduciary duty analysis, a decision by independent directors
to approve a transaction with a self-interested director (even one who
controls a large block of the corporation’s stock) would be entitled to the
favorable presumptions of the business judgment rule.78
Another transactional device used to reduce a large stockholder’s
power is to require that the merger be approved by a majority of the
disinterested stockholders.79 Thus, stockholder approval amounts to
ratification of the transaction by the disinterested stockholders.
Traditionally, stockholder ratification “has the effect of protecting the
transaction from judicial review except on the basis of waste.”80
These two devices (the special committee of independent directors
and ratification by a majority of independent stockholders)81 function at
different theoretical levels and provide independent mechanisms to
avoid the entire fairness standard of review.82 The use of independent
directors has the effect of placing the board’s decision-making function
into impartial hands. Thus, it can restore the favorable presumptions of
the business judgment rule. The use of ratification by a majority of the
disinterested stockholders does not implicate the business judgment rule
76. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711-12. This obligation derives from the parent’s superior
access to information. Id. at 711.
77. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 798, 804.
78. Puma v. Marriott, Inc., 283 A.2d 693, 695-96 (Del. Ch. 1971). This practice is consistent
with Delaware’s preference for having corporate decisions made by neutral decision-makers
empowered through corporate procedures. See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879
A.2d 604, 606-07 (Del. Ch. 2005).
79. In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 547-48 (Del. Ch. 2003).
80. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997). See also Gottlieb v. Heyden
Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58 (Del. 1952); Keenan v. Eshleman, 2 A.2d 904, 909 (Del. 1938).
81. These two transactional devices are also consistent with the Delaware statute which
provides a safe-harbor for transactions involving self-interested directors. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
144 (2006). See generally EDWARD P. WELCH, ANDREW J. TUREZYN & ROBERT S. SAUNDERS,
FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW, § 251.6.4, .6.4.4, .6.4.6 (5th ed., Aspen
2006). Under the safe-harbor provision, a transaction between a corporation and one of its officers
or directors is not deemed to be per se voidable if it was approved by a majority of the disinterested
directors, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2006), or a majority of the disinterested stockholders,
tit. 8, § 144(a)(2). Cooke v. Oolie, No. Civ. A. 11134, 1997 WL 367034, at *9 (Del. Ch. 1997). In
other words, section 144 upholds the validity of a transaction where it is approved by neutral
directors or ratified by neutral stockholders.
82. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 9844, 1988 WL 111271, at
*7 (Del. Ch. 1988), abrogated by Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
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because the business judgment rule does not apply to stockholder
decisions. Stockholder ratification functions like ratification by a
principal of an agent’s unauthorized actions. It is a means by which the
stockholders, to whom the duty of loyalty is owed, are able to accept the
board’s decision and thus place it beyond judicial review.
B. The Lynch Doctrine
Weinberger’s emphasis on the importance of determining price
through arm’s-length negotiation was thought by some to suggest that by
neutralizing the majority stockholder’s control over the “sell” side of the
merger, the majority stockholder would no longer be on both sides of the
transaction; thus, the majority stockholder would not have to prove the
entire fairness of the merger.83 In other words, the court might be
willing to accept the fairness of the merger price if it was the result of
arm’s-length negotiation.84 This idea fits well with the business
judgment rule which prohibits courts from second guessing decisions
made in good faith by independent and disinterested directors85 and with
Delaware’s preference for having corporate decisions made by neutral
decision-makers empowered through corporate procedures rather than
by judges.86
Two cases in the Court of Chancery accepted the use of these
neutralizing devices as means of avoiding the automatic imposition of
the entire fairness standard of review.87 On the other hand, two other
cases decided by different judges in the same court held that the use of
either of these devices would not remove the transaction from the
exacting requirements of the entire fairness standard; rather, it would
merely shift to the plaintiff the burden of proving that the transaction
was not entirely fair.88
This split was resolved by Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems,
89
Inc., in which the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the proposition
83. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 798.
84. See id.
85. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
86. In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 606-07 (Del. Ch. 2005).
87. In re Trans World Airlines, 1988 WL 111271, at *7; Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
Civ. A. No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134, at *9-11 (Del. Ch. 1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on
other grounds, Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
88. Citron v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 500-02 (Del. Ch. 1990); Rabkin
v. Olin Corp., C.A. No. 7547, 1990 WL 47648, at *6 (Del. Ch. 1990), aff’d on other grounds, 586
A.2d 1202 (Del. 1990).
89. 638 A.2d 1110.
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that the use of either of the neutralizing devices would defeat a breach of
fiduciary duty claim and leave stockholders with only the statutory
remedy of appraisal.90 Establishing what has come to be known as the
“Lynch Doctrine,” 91 the Court held that a going-private merger between
a “controlling stockholder”92 and the controlled corporation would be
judged under Delaware’s “entire fairness” standard of review even if the
merger had been negotiated by an independent special committee or
approved by a majority of the independent stockholders.93
Under the Lynch Doctrine, a going private transaction must
necessarily be judged under the entire fairness standard of review.94
Thus use of either the special committee or requiring approval by
disinterested stockholders merely has the effect of shifting the burden to
the plaintiff to show that the transaction was not entirely fair to the
unaffiliated stockholders.95 The Court explained: “Entire fairness
remains the proper focus of judicial analysis in examining an interested
merger, irrespective of whether the burden of proof remains upon or is
shifted away from the controlling or dominating shareholder, because
the unchanging nature of the underlying ‘interested’ transaction requires
careful scrutiny.”96
In other words, the court retained the entire fairness standard
because it provided the jurisprudential tool that would allow the court to
examine the substantive merits of the transaction to make sure it was
entirely fair. The business judgment rule and its requirement of judicial
deference to a decision by impartial directors would not permit such an
90. See id. at 1116-17. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 800.
91. The term “Lynch doctrine” was coined by Vice Chancellor Strine in In re Cysive, Inc.
S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 547 (Del.Ch. 2003). The doctrine takes its name from the name of
the defendant corporation in Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, rather
than the name of the plaintiff because there are so many Delaware cases filed by plaintiffs with the
name Kahn.
92. The term “controlling stockholder” is used here to refer to a stockholder who owns a large
block of stock in the subject corporation and uses the clout conferred by its stockholdings to
exercise practical control over the corporation. See Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1113-14; Ivanhoe Partners
v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d
1050, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1984). A stockholder who owns a majority of a company’s shares is deemed
as a matter of law to be a “controlling stockholder.” Weinstein Enters., Inc. v. Orloff, 870 A.2d
499, 507 (Del. 2005). See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del.
1994); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989). Where a
stockholder holds less than a majority of the subject corporation’s shares, the presumption is that the
stockholder does not exercise control and the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the stockholder
does, in fact, exercise practical control over the corporation. Id.; Gilbert, 490 A.2d at 1055.
93. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1115-17.
94. Emerald Partners III, 787 A.2d 85, 92-93 (Del. 2001).
95. Id.
96. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1116.
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inquiry.
The court retained the ability to examine the merits of the
transaction because it did not fully trust the directors’ independence,
objectivity, or their will to negotiate as aggressively as they would in a
true arm’s-length transaction.97 The Court explained: “in a merger
between the corporation and its controlling stockholder – even one
negotiated by disinterested, independent directors – no court could be
certain whether the transaction terms fully approximate what truly
independent parties would have achieved in an arm’s length
negotiation.”98
The Court also feared that the presence of a controlling stockholder
would intimidate the disinterested stockholders. Thus, it refused to give
effect to stockholder ratification in the context of a going-private merger
because it thought the stockholders might vote to approve the merger
solely out of fear that the controlling stockholder might visit retribution
on them if they did not do so.99
Thus, in the context of a going-private merger, the court was so
concerned about the latent power of a controlling or majority
stockholder, even when that power had been formally neutralized by the
use of a special committee of independent directors and even when the
transaction had been ratified by independent stockholders, that the court
retained the entire fairness standard to allow the court to make sure the
merger was the product of fair dealing and that the unaffiliated
stockholders were paid a fair price for their shares. In other words, the
court wanted the last word as to whether the corporation should enter
into the going-private merger.
C. Problems with Lynch
The Lynch Doctrine’s automatic application of the entire fairness
standard of review was intended to allow the court an opportunity to
97. Id. at 1117.
98. Id. at 1116. The facts in Lynch did not provide a fully empowered independent
committee. The transaction was between the corporation and a stockholder that owned 43.3% of its
stock. Id. at 1114. The court found, as a matter of fact, that the stockholder exercised actual control
over the corporation. Id. at 1115. It also found that the special committee was lacking in power and
had been bullied by the stockholder. Id. at 1114-15. Thus, the stockholder had stood “on both sides
of the transaction.” Id. at 1117. Lynch suggests that to accomplish the shift, the committee must
actually have the power to say no. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 802.
99. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1116-17. Quoting Citron v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584
A.2d 490, 502, the court said: “Even where no coercion is intended, shareholders voting on a parent
subsidiary merger might perceive that their disapproval could risk retaliation of some kind by the
controlling stockholder.” Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1116.
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review the substance of the transaction to make sure that the transaction
was the product of “fair dealing” and that the unaffiliated stockholder
received a “fair price” for their shares. 100 But, in practice it has
generated unintended results that make it inefficient and ineffective.101
1. Lynch Makes Trial Unavoidable
The Lynch Doctrine’s imposition of the entire fairness doctrine ab
initio102 renders the usual motions by which a trial court can dispose of
non-meritorious litigation ineffective.103 If a Lynch claim is brought as a
derivative action, a Rule 26 motion to dismiss for failure to comply with
the demand requirement is of no avail.104 The Aronson decision holds
that demand is excused if the plaintiff can plead facts showing that the
challenged transaction is not the product of a valid business judgment.105
Under the Lynch Doctrine, the business judgment rule does not apply to
going-private mergers.106 Accordingly, the stockholder challenge to a
going-private merger automatically satisfies the “demand excused”
prong of the demand requirement.107
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is also ineffective.108 The entire
fairness standard requires the court to determine whether the merger was
the product of fair dealing and paid a fair price.109 The fairness of the
price is determined by the fair value of the corporation as measured by
modern financial techniques.110 The concept of fair value is so vague
and so fact-intensive that a plaintiff can always plead in good faith that
the merger price is not entirely fair.111 Even after complete discovery,
100. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1115-17; Emerald Partners III, 787 A.2d at 97; Cullman I, 794 A.2d
5, 20 (Del. Ch. 2002).
101. See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 605-07, 617-23 (Del. Ch.
2005); In re Cysive Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 547-51 (Del. Ch. 2000); In re Pure Res.,
Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 435, 444 (Del. Ch. 2002).
102. Emerald Partners III, 787 A.2d at 92-93.
103. See In re Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 619-20.
104. Orman v. Cullman
105. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816-17 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
106. In re Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 616-17.
107. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815.
108. Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 279 (Del. 2003) (holding that the validity of a special
committee could not be decided at the pleading stage).
109. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
110. Id. at 713.
111. In re Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 635. The determination of fair price requires the court
to determine the range of value for the corporation’s shares. WELCH, TUREZYN, & SAUNDERS,
supra note 81, § 251.6.3. This is always subject to dispute between exporters as to the appropriate
financial theory to apply, the appropriate variables to use in making financial projections and
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the factual complexity of this analysis makes this issue unlikely to be
subject to resolution by a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.112
2. Lynch Increases the Complexity of the Trial
Lynch not only makes it all but impossible to avoid trial; it makes
trial more complex.
a. Litigation over Standard of Review
The Lynch Doctrine only applies to a stockholder who owns less
than a majority of the corporation’s shares if that stockholder is a
“controlling stockholder.”113 In a case asserting a Lynch claim, the
stockholder defendant will seek to avoid the entire fairness standard of
review by arguing that it did not, in fact, exercise control over the
corporation. This becomes a question of fact that must be resolved at the
outset to determine what legal standard the court will use to judge the
case.114 A lot is at stake. If the plaintiff fails to persuade the court that
the stockholder defendant is in control, the case will be decided under
the highly deferential business judgment rule.115 But, if the plaintiff
succeeds in proving control, the burden shifts to the defendants to prove
entire fairness.116
The issue of control is fact intensive and not likely to be resolved
by pre-trial motion.117 Thus, it becomes part of the trial. Because it
determines what standard of review will govern the plaintiff’s claim, the
plaintiff should prove this issue first. But the facts that will determine
the issue of control often relate to “fair dealing” issues as to which the
defendant may have a burden of proof.
b. Litigation over Burden Shifting
The defendant stockholder, after having been found to have been a
controlling stockholder, may then seek to shift the burden back to the

present value estimates, and even the facts on which these estimates are to be based. Valuation is
not an exact science.
112. In re Cysive S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 548 n.19 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Cox
Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 648.
113. In re Cysive S’holders Litig.¸ 836 A.2d at 550.
114. Id. at 551.
115. In re W. Nat’l Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 15927, 2000 WL 710192 at *1-2 (Del. Ch. May
22, 2000).
116. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994).
117. In re Cysive, 836 A.2d at 550-51.
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plaintiff by proving that the transaction was negotiated and approved by
a special committee of independent directors or that it was ratified by a
majority of the independent stockholders.118
Where a special committee has been appointed, the defendant has
the burden of proving the independence, diligence and power of the
committee.119 Each of these points is fact-intensive and each is unlikely
to be resolved before the trial by a motion in limine.120 Thus the
defendants must proceed with proof at trial on each of these points.
Alternatively, where the transaction has been approved by a majority of
the disinterested stockholders, the defendants must prove that the
disclosures sent to the stockholders to solicit their votes were complete
and not misleading.121 This, too, is the sort of thing that can involve
disputed facts. As a result, the question whether the stockholder
ratification was fully informed and thus earned a shift in the burden of
proof on the entire fairness must usually be resolved at trial.122
This presents another point of confusion. The use of an effective
special committee is “strong evidence” of fair dealing.123 So, too, is the
completeness of the disclosures made to the unaffiliated stockholders in
the documents soliciting their approval of the transaction.124 Thus, to
shift the burden of proof on the entire fairness issue, the defendants must
prove most of the facts that will satisfy the fair dealing component of the
entire fairness standard.125 In other words, to shift the burden of proof as
to the “entire fairness” of the merger, the defendants must prove most of
the facts that establish the “fair dealing” component of “entire fairness.”
That is not a meaningful shift.
Although it would be a slight overstatement, the effect of the Lynch
Doctrine’s shift in the burden of proof on the entire fairness issue could
be summarized this way: if the defendants can prove the “fair dealing”
component of fair dealing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that
the merger consideration does not satisfy the “fair price” component.

118. In re Cysive, 836 A.2d at 547.
119. Id. at 550.
120. Id. at 551.
121. In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 618-19 (Del. Ch. 2005).
122. In re Cysive, 836 A.2d at 549.
123. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983).
124. See id. at 709.
125. Fair dealing can also raise issues relating to the way the merger is initiated and whether it
is timed to the advantage of the controlling stockholder and the concomitant disadvantage of the
unaffiliated stockholders. WELCH, TUREZYN, & SAUNDERS, supra note 81, § 251.6.4.1.
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c. The Insignificance of Burden Shifting
The benefit conferred by shifting the burden of proof with regard to
the “entire fairness” issue is slight. As the Court of Chancery recently
explained, the question of who has the burden of proof is only important
when the facts are in precise equipoise.126 In that circumstance, under
the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, the party with the
burden is said to have failed to prove its case. But it is seldom, if ever,
the case that the facts in these complicated going private cases are in
equipoise.127 If follows that burden of proof is of little consequence.
For this reason, and because the determination of the burden of proof
issue requires a finding of fact regarding facts that also bear on the
ultimate question of entire fairness, it is the practice for both parties to
proceed at trial as if they had the burden of proof.128
D. Lynch Creates a “Class Appraisal Action”
Traditionally, the statutory remedy of appraisal has been considered
the exclusive remedy available to a plaintiff who challenges only the
price at which a merger is effectuated.129 But, the Lynch Doctrine’s
automatic application of the entire fairness standard of review allows a
plaintiff to bring a breach of fiduciary duty action, even when the merger
has been approved by a special committee of independent directors,
claiming that the merger price is not entirely fair.130 As discussed above,
approval of the merger by independent directors satisfies the fair dealing
component of the entire fairness standard and shifts the burden to the
plaintiff to prove that the price is not entirely fair.
This reveals another problem with the Lynch Doctrine. It creates
what amounts to a class appraisal action as the remedy for going private
mergers, making them the only merger for which statutory appraisal is
not the exclusive remedy. The difference between a class action and an

126. See In re Pure Res, Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 436 (Del. Ch. 2002).
127. See id.
128. In re Cysive S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 549 (Del. Ch. 2003).
129. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001); Weinberger, 457 A.2d
at 703.
130. WELCH, TUREZYN, & SAUNDERS, supra note 8181, § 251.6.2, .6.2.1. This common law
remedy is in addition to the statutory remedy of appraisal. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2006).
Before the challenged transaction is effectuated, a Lynch Doctrine claim can be brought as a
derivative action seeking injunctive relief. See, e.g., In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879
A.2d 604, 605-06 (Del. Ch. 2005). After the transaction is completed it becomes an individual
action brought by a stockholder on behalf of him or her self, or more likely, a class of similarly
situated stockholders. See, e.g., Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 702-03.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 3
FURLOWFINAL.DOC

106

3/26/2007 12:26:47 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[40:85

appraisal action is more than merely procedural.
An appraisal action is technical, expensive, and risky. To bring an
appraisal claim a stockholder must comply with the technicalities of the
appraisal statute.131 Only a stockholder who has complied with the
statute is entitled to participate in the appraisal action.132 Thus an
appraisal action cannot be brought as a class action on behalf of all
stockholders; rather, it is brought only for the benefit of those who have
complied with the statutory requirements for perfecting their appraisal
rights.133 Once a stockholder demands appraisal, he or she is no longer
entitled to receive the merger consideration. The stockholder receives
no compensation for his or her canceled shares until the appraisal
litigation is concluded.134 At that point, the stockholder is entitled to
receive the amount determined by the court to be the fair value of his or
her shares, which may be less than the merger price.135
A “class appraisal action” brought under the Lynch Doctrine is a
much more attractive remedy for stockholders. The stockholder does
not have to comply with the technicalities of the appraisal statute, does
not have to wait until the conclusion of the litigation to be paid for his or
her shares, and does not risk receiving less than the merger price.136
Moreover, the costs of litigation can be distributed among all
shareholders.137
In summary, the Lynch Doctrine allows a plaintiff to challenge a
going-private merger, even one negotiated by a special committee,
solely on the basis of price and have the valuation issues resolved under
the same principles that would apply in an appraisal action without
complying with the statute’s technicalities and without taking on
appraisal’s down-side risk.138

131. Under the appraisal statute a stockholder must perfect its right to appraisal by not voting
for the merger, making a timely appraisal demand on the corporation, and filing the action in the
court of chancery within 120 days. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a), (d)(1), (e).
132. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 798. Typically, this is a small number. Id. at 798-99.
133. See Raynor v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 317 A.2d 43, 45 (Del. Ch. 1974); In re Shell Oil
Co., slip op at 2 (Del. Ch. 1986); In re Shell Oil Co., slip op at 2 (Del. Ch. 1988).
134. See Henke v. Trilithic, Inc., No. Civ. A. 13155, 2005 WL 3578094, at *2 n.13 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 20, 2005).
135. Id.
136. See Gilson and Gordon, supra note 1, at 798-99. The Delaware appraisal statute does not
authorize a class action procedure. Id. at 799.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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E. Lynch Encourages “Tag-Along” Settlements
Because the Lynch claim cannot be resolved short of trial,
defendants find it cost-effective to settle even frivolous claims.139 This
has led to a new style of litigation in which stockholder plaintiffs file
their claims solely for the purpose of having a bargaining position from
which to seek a settlement.
The practice works this way: The plaintiff files a “generic” breach
of fiduciary duty complaint within minutes140 after a majority
stockholder (or a large and thus a potentially controlling stockholder)
proposes a merger between itself and the corporation.141 These
complaints are filed even when the controlling stockholder states that the
merger price is negotiable and asks the corporation to appoint a special
committee to conduct that negotiation.142 At this stage of the transaction
the corporation has not agreed to anything and thus there can have been
no breach of fiduciary duty by the corporation’s directors. Nonetheless,
the plaintiffs are able to state a claim by alleging the controlling
stockholder has breached its fiduciary duty of entire fairness by offering
an inadequate merger price.143 Thus, the complaint can be filed even
though, as yet, there is no transaction to challenge.
In response to the controlling stockholder’s offer, the corporation’s
board appoints a special committee of independent directors to negotiate
a better deal for the unaffiliated stockholders.144 Because the controlling
stockholder, like any other person proposing a transaction, is unlikely to
begin the process by offering its best price, these negotiations typically
result in an improvement in the merger price.145 Concurrently with these
negotiations the controlling stockholder opens parallel negotiations with
the stockholder plaintiffs.146 When the special committee and the
controlling stockholder reach tacit agreement on price, the controlling
stockholder proposes settlement with the stockholder plaintiffs at the
139. In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 605-06 (Del. Ch. 2005).
140. Going-private mergers, like other financial transactions, are usually announced early in
the morning so that they will appear in that day’s financial newspapers. The office of the Registrar
in Chancery (the clerk for the Delaware Court of Chancery) opens at 8:30 a.m. Typically, on the
day a transaction is announced, the Registrar will have received several “generic” complaints
challenging the transaction before 9:00 a.m. Plaintiffs’ lawyers rush to be the first filed in the hope
of gaining advantage vis-à-vis one another in the battle to control the litigation.
141. See In re Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 607-08.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 608.
144. Id. at 605-06.
145. Id. at 621.
146. Id. at 620-21.
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same price.147 The special committee then agrees to the merger at the
increased price provided the controlling stockholder can produce a
global settlement with the stockholder plaintiffs, and the stockholder
plaintiffs agree to the global settlement provided the special committee
agrees that their participation in the negotiations contributed to the
increase in the merger price.148
The Court of Chancery has referred to this as “an odd form of
tantra”149 that produces the “simultaneous bliss” of the plaintiffs’
lawyers (who have earned the right to claim attorney’s fees), the
directors on the special committee (who by virtue of court approval of
the settlement avoid any possibility of personal liability) and the
controlling stockholder (who has succeeded in taking the corporation
private without having to litigate a Lynch claim in court).150
The vast majority of Lynch Doctrine claims are settled this way.151
Ironically, a legal rule that was intended to give courts the opportunity to
review going-private mergers to make sure they are entirely fair to
stockholders has, in practice, relegated the court to the role of reviewing
settlement agreements.152
F. The Lynch Doctrine Deviates from Traditional Corporation Law
The source of these problems are the Lynch doctrine’s focus on the
fiduciary duties of the controlling stockholder, its automatic application
of the entire fairness standard to going-private mergers, and its burdenshifting provisions. In each respect Lynch departs from traditional
doctrine. A return to traditional principles will solve these problems by
making the law governing fiduciary duties in going-private mergers
consistent with the law governing fiduciary duties in other self-interested
transactions, and by establishing a framework that will allow the two
types of going private transactions to be governed by the same standards.

147. Id. at 621.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 621. The word “tantra” derives form the Sanskrit and refers to certain meditative
and sexual practices and rituals.
150. Id. These cases, which are part of the unintended consequence of the Lynch Doctrine
have been justly criticized. Id. at 622-23.
151. Id. at 631-32. The rare exception is In re Cysive. See In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig.,
836 A.2d 531 (Del. Ch. 2003).
152. When reviewing a settlement, a court is merely required to determine whether the
plaintiff’s complaint stated a colorable claim and whether the settlement consideration is adequate
when measured against the strength of the claim. Thus, the court does not give close scrutiny to the
fairness of the merger as contemplated by Lynch.
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1. Directors’ Breach of Duty
Lynch’s automatic imposition of the entire fairness standard is
based on the assumption that the corporation is controlled by its majority
stockholder.153 But, as a matter of statutory law, no stockholder, not
even a majority stockholder, has direct control in the management of a
corporation.154 The power to manage a corporation is vested exclusively
in the board of directors.155 The implications of this point are profound.
A majority stockholder can only exercise control over a corporation
with respect to a particular transaction when a majority of the members
of its board of directors subordinate themselves to the domination,
control, or influence of the majority stockholder. In other words, the
majority of the board must be willing to make a decision based on the
best interests of the majority stockholder rather than the best interests of
the corporation. Put differently, the majority of the board is doing the
bidding of the majority stockholder, in violation of its fiduciary duty of
loyalty to the corporation. Thus, for a “controlling stockholder” to exist,
it must have the ability to corrupt a majority of the board of directors,
and concomitantly, a majority of the board must be willing to abandon
its duty of loyalty. Conversely, where a board satisfies its fiduciary duty
to make decisions in the best interests of the company, regardless of the
wishes of the powerful stockholder, the board is in control.156 The
powerful stockholder is not a “controlling stockholder.”
2. The Business Judgment Rule
But what of the directors who are assumed to be controlled (or at
least intimidated) by the majority stockholder? Traditionally, the
directors’ decision to approve a merger is reviewed under the business
judgment rule.157 The business judgment rule functions as a procedural
153. The Court recently put it this way: “In the context of imposing fiduciary responsibilities, it
is well established in the corporate jurisprudence of Delaware that control exists when a stockholder
owns, directly or indirectly, more than half of a corporation’s voting power.” Weinstein
Enterprises, Inc., v. Orloff, 870 A.2d 499, 507 (Del. 2005).
154. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 141(a) (2006). See DeMott, supra note 48, at 236. Stockholders
do not have the power or right to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000);
Cullman I, 794 A.2d 5, 19 (Del. Ch. 2002).
155. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 141(a).
156. For an example of an independent board defying the wishes of a controlling stockholder
see Hollinger International, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2004).
157. E.g., Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 287-88 (Del. 2003); Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Muschell v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904, 907-08 (Del. Ch. 1973)
(stockholders of acquiring company challenge a stock swap merger negotiated at arm’s-length);
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and a substantive rule.158
The procedural aspects of the business judgment rule begin with the
presumption that “in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”159
In other words, the business judgment rule presumes the directors have
met their fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and good faith in approving
the challenged transaction.160 The business judgment rule requires the
stockholder-plaintiff to rebut this presumption161 by pleading (and at trial
proving) facts that create reason to question the directors’ performance
of these fiduciary duties.162 With respect to issues pertinent to goingprivate mergers, a plaintiff may meet this burden by placing directors’
performance of their duty of loyalty in question.163 Typically this is
accomplished with facts that suggest the directors lack disinterestedness
or independence with respect to the challenged transaction.164

Cole v. Nat’l Cash Credit Ass’n., 156 A. 183, 188 (Del. Ch. 1931) (rejecting preferred stockholder’s
challenge to an arm’s-length merger because the presumption of fairness that supports the
discretionary judgment of directors means that the court must defer to the action of the board even
though it may be ill-advised or apparently unprofitable.); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. 663
A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995).
158. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1162; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 74647 (Del. Ch. 2005).
159. Emerald Partners III, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
160. See Cullman I, 794 A.2d at 19-20 (Del. Ch. 2002) (citing cases supporting this
presumption).
161. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1162.
162. Id. at 1163-64 (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993),
modified, 636 A.2d 956 (1994)). Challenges to a board’s decision making function are often
brought as stockholder derivative actions. In the demand refused context, the burden imposed by
the business judgment rule overlaps with Rule 23.1 and Aronson which require a plaintiff to plead
with particularity facts that tend to establish a reason to doubt that the challenged transaction will be
subject to the protection of the business judgment rule. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808, 814
(Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 716 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
163. Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 984 (Del. Ch. 2000). A plaintiff
can dispel the presumption by showing that directors failed to fulfill their duty of care or did not
make the decision in good faith. Id.
164. Cullman I, 794 A.2d 5, 22 (Del. Ch. 2002).
To rebut successfully business judgment presumptions in this manner, thereby leading to
the application of the entire fairness standard, a plaintiff must normally plead facts
demonstrating ‘that a majority of the director defendants have a financial interest in the
transaction or were dominated or controlled by a materially interested director.’
Id. (quoting Crescent/Mach I Partners, 846 A.2d at 979) (emphasis added by Cullman I court). To
show domination and control, the director should be independent. “Independence means that a
director’s decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than
extraneous considerations or influences.” Cullman I, 794 A.2d at 24 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at
816).
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For example, in Wisconsin Investment Board v. Bartlett,165 the court
said:
In the context of a merger, a breach of fiduciary duty analysis begins
with the rebuttable presumption that a board of directors acted with
care, loyalty, and in ‘good faith.’ Unless this presumption is
sufficiently rebutted, raising a reasonable doubt about self-interest or
independence, the Court must defer to the discretion of the board and
acknowledge that their decisions are entitled to the protection of the
business judgment rule.166

Under the Lynch Doctrine the presumptions are precisely the
opposite of those under the business judgment rule. The Lynch doctrine
rests on the presumption that a majority of the board is to some extent
corrupted by the intimidating power of the majority stockholder.167 But
under the business judgment rule, the mere existence of majority
stockholder is not sufficient to place the loyalty of the board in issue.168
For example, in the context of the demand requirement in stockholder
derivative litigation, the fact that a person holds 94% of the voting
power in a corporation is not sufficient to challenge the ability of the
board to make an impartial decision regarding that person.169 And when
the board makes a decision in other contexts, the existence of a
controlling stockholder, standing alone, is not sufficient to call into
question the independence of the board.170 By way of contrast, under the
165. No. Civ. A. 17727, 2000 WL 238026 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2000).
166. Id. at *4. See also Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A.2d 148, 151-52. (Del. Ch. 1943)
(stating a board is entitled to a presumption that it acted in good faith when approving the terms of
the challenged merger). Even in an arm’s-length merger the standard by which the target
company’s board decision to approve the merger will be judged will vary depending on the nature
of the consideration to be received by the target company stockholders in exchange for the canceled
target company shares. See Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 928-29 (Del. 2003).
If they receive cash or other consideration that does not involve on-going participation in the
company’s future, they will be judged under the Revlon articulation of the business judgment rule.
Id. If it is a stock-swap, then the decision will be judged under the business judgment rule. Id. at
29.
167. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994).
168. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1054
(Del. 2004).
169. Id. See also Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815 (stating that for purposes of the demand
requirement in stockholder derivative litigation, the defendant’s ownership of a majority of the
company’s stock is not enough to create a doubt as to the independence of the board).
170. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1378 n.22 (Del. 1996). “The mere fact that the
Family Group owned a dominant stock interest does not rebut the presumption of the business
judgment rule or call the directors’ independence into question.” Id. See also Puma v. Marriott,
Inc., 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971). Members of the Marriott group owned some 46% of
Marriott Corp’s stock, but that is not enough to place them in control of the company. Id. They
have made no attempt to “impugn the integrity,” independence or “good faith” of the five outside
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Lynch Doctrine, the entire fairness standard of review applies “[e]ven if
the controlling stockholder has elected a board comprised of a majority
of independent directors, which has negotiated and approved the merger
terms. . . .”171
The conflict between the business judgment rule and the Lynch
Doctrine creates an anomaly. Consider a going-private merger in which
a majority of the members of the corporation’s board are independent
outsiders who form a special committee to negotiate with the majority
stockholder. After diligent and hard bargaining, they negotiate and
agree to a merger they believe will serve the best interests of the
unaffiliated stockholders. If the merger is challenged, the members of
the committee and the majority stockholder will be named as defendants.
But the members of the committee will be entitled to the substantive
protections of the business judgment rule, and a claim against them will
be dismissed. The claim against the majority stockholder, on the other
hand, will be judged under the entire fairness standard.172 That claim
will proceed to trial, and at trial, the majority stockholder faces potential
liability for breach of its fiduciary duty to pay an entirely fair price.173
This result makes no sense. The directors, whose approval of the merger
allowed the transaction to be effectuated, would be protected from
liability by the business judgment rule; but the stockholder who merely
proposed the deal and had no control over the corporation’s decision to
accept would face liability.
3. Controlling Stockholder’s Duty
The Lynch Doctrine’s review of going-private mergers under the
“entire fairness” standard where the transaction has been negotiated and
approved by a special committee of independent directors is inconsistent
with the reasons why the law imposes a duty of entire fairness on
controlling stockholders.174 That duty is imposed when the stockholder
is able to exercise actual control over the corporation’s board of
directors. Id. Moreover, the Marriott group did not dictate the “terms of the transactions.” Id. On
the contrary, the majority of the Marriott Directors initiated the deal. Id. Therefore, the board’s
approval will be reviewed under the business judgment rule, because the Marriott group did not
stand “on both sides of the transaction.” Id.
171. In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 547 (Del. Ch. 2003).
172. Id.
173. The only effect the approval by an impartial special committee or a board of independent
directors would have on the claim against the majority stockholder would be to impose on the
plaintiff the burden of proving that the merger was unfair in some respect. See In re Cysive, 836
A.2d at 548.
174. See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 616-17 (Del. Ch. 2005).
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directors.175
The emphasis on the reality of control is significant. It is the actual
exercise of control over the board that causes the law to impose a
fiduciary duty on stockholder.176 In Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels,
Inc.,177 the Court explained it this way: entire or intrinsic fairness
standard applies “when fiduciaries [by which the Court was referring to
controlling stockholders] elect to utilize their power over the
corporation to effectuate a transaction in which they have an interest
that diverges from that of the corporation or the minority
shareholders.”178
This fiduciary duty prevents the controlling
stockholder “from exercising corporate power (either formally as
directors or officers or informally through control over officers and
directors) so as to advantage themselves while disadvantaging the
corporation.”179
In the absence of the ability to exercise control over the board, a
powerful stockholder is not, as a matter of fact, a controlling
stockholder. Without control, there is no doctrinal foundation to impose
a fiduciary duty to make the transaction entirely fair. The powerful
stockholder controls only one side of the transaction. It cannot,
unilaterally, make the transaction entirely fair.180 There can be no deal
unless the corporation agrees, and the powerful stockholder has no
control over that decision.
175. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994).
176. The importance of the control over the board as the jurisprudential foundation for the
imposition of a fiduciary duty on a majority stockholder is illustrated by the way the courts treat a
stockholder who owns less than a majority of the company’s shares. In the absence of majority
ownership, a fiduciary duty of entire fairness is not imposed on a stockholder unless the plaintiff is
able to demonstrate that the stockholder used the clout conferred by its stockholdings to actually
exercise control over the corporation. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1113-14; Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont
Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987); In re W. Nat’l Corp. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A.
15927, 2000 WL 710192 at *6 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2000). The mere potential to have the ability to
exercise control is not enough; the actual exercise of control is required to impose a fiduciary duty
of entire fairness. In re Sea-Land Corp. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 8453,1987 Del. Ch. LEXIS
439 at *12-13 (Del. Ch. May 22, 1987).
177. 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986).
178. Id. at 594 (emphasis added). See DeMott, supra note 48, at 236.
179. Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., Civ. A. No. 11713, 1995 WL 478954 at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9,
1995).
180. This fits well with the proposition that “entire fairness” includes “fair dealing,” and a
process that replicates arm’s-length negotiation is powerful evidence of “fair dealing.” Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983). If the powerful stockholder were required to
unilaterally make the deal entirely fair, it would have to begin by offering a fully fair price. In such
a circumstance there would be nothing left to negotiate. Surely, the objective or replicating arm’slength negotiations contemplates that the powerful stockholder will begin the process with less than
its best offer.
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G. Proposed Solutions to the Lynch Doctrine
Commentators181 and one judge on the Court of Chancery182 have
proposed solving the Lynch Doctrine problems by abandoning the
automatic application of the entire fairness standard when the merger is
approved by both a special committee and a majority of the disinterested
stockholders.183 Under these proposals, the court would defer to the
decision of a special committee of independent directors and give effect
to ratification by independent stockholders.184
A complaint challenging a going-private merger would be subject
to dismissal unless the plaintiff can plead particularized facts that (1) call
into question the validity of board approval by either (a) creating doubt
as to the special committee’s independence, effectiveness, or
performance of its fiduciary duties or (b) demonstrating that the
committee was deceived or defrauded by the controlling stockholder, or
(2) call into question the validity of stockholder ratification by either (a)
faulty disclosures or (b) actual or structural coercion.185 If the plaintiff
succeeds in pleading facts that satisfy any one of these elements, the
transaction would be judged under the entire fairness standard.186
This proposal has merit. It creates an incentive for transactional
planners to fully remove the powerful stockholder from decision-making
on the corporation’s side of the transaction.187 In this respect it
accomplishes the goal of the Lynch Doctrine – to recreate as nearly as

181. Subramanian, supra note 8, at 70; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 786.
182. In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 606, 643 (Del. Ch. 2005). The
proposal is laid out in what may be the longest dictum in Delaware jurisprudence.
183. Id. The Vice-Chancellor points out that in Lynch the Delaware Supreme Court held that
the use of either (1) a special committee of independent directors, standing alone, and (2)
ratification by a majority of the disinterested stockholders would shift the burden of proving
unfairness to the plaintiff. Id. at 643-44. But, the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the effect of
using both devices concurrently. Thus, the Supreme Court would not have to overrule Lynch to
hold that a going-private merger can be reviewed under the procedural and substantive aspects of
the business judgment rule where the controlling stockholder conditions the merger on the use of
both devices (requiring that board approval of the merger be based on the recommendation of a
special committee of independent, disinterested directors and that stockholder approval come from
disinterested stockholders).
184. In re Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 644.
185. Id.
186. See id. The opinion suggests that “if a controller proposed a merger, subject from
inception to negotiation and approval of the merger by an independent special committee and a
Minority Approval Condition, the business judgment rule should presumptively apply.” Id. Yet the
opinion infers that, if the plaintiffs can plead “particularized facts that the special committee was not
independent or was not effective because of its own breach of fiduciary duty or wrongdoing by the
controller” then the entire fairness standard still applies. Id.
187. Id. at 606-07.
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possible the dynamics of an arm’s-length negotiation.188
The Lynch Doctrine was intended to encourage transactional
planners to structure going-private mergers in a way that would assure
that the merger price reflected arm’s-length negotiation.189 In an arm’slength merger, the board, functioning as an agent for the stockholders,
seeks to negotiate the best deal it can achieve.190 When it reaches a
satisfactory agreement, the deal is submitted to the stockholders for their
approval.191 This provides the stockholders the opportunity to accept or
reject the deal negotiated by their agent.192 The acquiror’s knowledge
that the deal must be good enough to earn stockholder approval gives the
target corporation’s board a tool to negotiate a higher price.
To fully replicate this arm’s-length process, the corporation would
have to put the negotiation of the merger terms in the hands of
independent directors and the stockholder approval in the hands of the
independent stockholders. In this way, the independent directors could
use the argument that the merger price would have to be attractive
enough to earn the approval of the independent stockholders as a
negotiating tool.193
The real flaw in the Lynch Doctrine is its preference for allowing
the decision as to the fairness of the merger to be made by judges.194
The court refused to rely on the business judgment of independent
directors who approve, because it feared they would be intimidated by
the controlling stockholder.195 However, experience has shown that the
use of a special committee has generated transactions that are more
favorable to stockholders than transactions where the committee is not
used.196 The Lynch court also refused to give ratification effect to
188. See Subramanian, supra note 8, at 8 (stating an arm’s length negotiation consists of
disinterested board approval and disinterested shareholder approval). “Translating the arms-length
standard to the freezeout arena requires, first, meaningful approval by . . . [a special committee] of
independent directors; and second, approval by a majority of the minority shareholders.” Id.
189. See In re Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 617.
190. Id. at 618.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 618-19.
193. In practice, the Lynch Doctrine has not provided an incentive to condition going-private
mergers on approval of the disinterested stockholders. See id. at 642-43. The Doctrine rewards the
use of a special committee by shifting to the plaintiff the burden of proving unfairness. See id. at
616-17. But, Lynch provides no additional reward for taking the added step of conditioning the
merger on approval by independent stockholder approval. See id. at 642-43.
194. See Kahn v. Lynch, 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994).
195. See In re Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 617.
196. See Subramanian, supra note 8, at 25 (explaining that based on empirical evidence,
special committees do generate transactions that are more favorable to stockholders than
transactions where they are not present). For example, Subramanian notes that minority
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approval of the transaction by disinterested stockholders because it
feared that they would be intimidated by the controlling stockholder.197
These proposals deal with this concern by discouraging the powerful
stockholder from threatening retribution or attempting to inappropriately
influence the stockholders. If the powerful stockholder were to engage
in that type of behavior, it would lose the benefit of the business
judgment rule.
Under these proposals, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading
particularized facts that call into question whether the committee was
truly independent and diligent and whether it performed its tasks in good
faith. This is precisely in accord with the business judgment rule.
Additionally, the question of whether the committee was vested with the
power to allow it to truly negotiate at arm’s length also bears on whether
the committee has been allowed to function as a truly independent
negotiator.198
These proposals are also consistent with the fundamental idea that a
stockholder assumes a fiduciary duty to the corporation when the
stockholder exercises control over the corporation’s board. In the
absence of facts suggesting that a stockholder, even a majority
stockholder, is in a position to control or influence the board, there is no
basis to impose on the stockholder a fiduciary duty of entire fairness. By
creating a special committee of independent directors, the majority
stockholder relinquishes the ability to exercise control over the board’s
decision. It is no longer “on both sides of the transaction” and thus
should not have a duty of entire fairness.
However, the Vice Chancellor’s proposal has one aspect that
diverges from traditional ideas regarding the fiduciary duties of
controlling stockholders. The Vice Chancellor would require a majority
stockholder to state in its initial merger proposal that the merger be
approved by the vote of a majority of the disinterested stockholders.199
If such a provision is not included, the Vice Chancellor’s proposal would
require that a majority stockholder shoulder a fiduciary duty of entire
fairness.200
This requirement conflicts with the traditional view that a majority
shareholders receive less in tender offer freezeouts, where a committee is not required, than in
merger freezeouts, where one is. Id. at 25. Subramanian continued, “This finding is further
supported by practitioner impressions that the binary choice of a tender decision is not a substitute
for vigorous bargaining by a [special committee].” Id.
197. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 800-01.
198. See Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117.
199. In re Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 643-44.
200. Id. at 644.
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stockholder’s voting power is not limited by a fiduciary duty to the
minority stockholders. 201 The court’s insistence on approval by a
majority of the minority necessarily has the effect of neutralizing the
majority stockholder’s voting power. In this respect, the proposal would
limit a majority stockholder free to exercise its voting power in its selfinterest. And by imposing the entire fairness standard of review if the
majority stockholder does use its voting power, the court enters
unprecedented territory. No Delaware case has held that a majority
stockholder’s exercise of its voting power, standing alone, can be judged
under the exacting requirements of the entire fairness standard of
review.202 Indeed, the cases hold precisely the opposite.203
The better way to achieve the desirable result of giving the
unaffiliated stockholders a veto over the going-private merger would be
to focus on duties of the special committee. In the exercise of its
independent duty to seek the best transaction for the public
stockholders,204 such a committee would have an obligation to seek to
give the public stockholders (the ones whose shares will be canceled) a
separate voice on the decision to approve the transaction. Thus the
committee should at least demand that the merger be subject to approval
by the independent stockholders. If the majority stockholder rejects this
demand, that would be a fact that would call into question the majority
stockholder’s willingness to fully empower the of the committee,
because the committee would not be able to use the argument that the
price would have to be high enough to earn the approval of the
stockholders as one of its negotiating tools.
Balance needs to be maintained. If the special committee is given
too strong a hand, it may block a merger that would be good for
stockholders.205 The controlling stockholder can proceed in the face of a
special committee’s refusal with a going-private tender offer.206
201. Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987).
202. In Hollinger International, the court found that the exercise of voting power to further a
scheme that was, itself, a breach of duty failed the entire fairness duty.
203. E.g., Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., Civ. A. No. 11713, 1995 WL 478954 at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug.
9, 1995).
204. Cases have held that a majority stockholder does not have a Revlon duty to offer the best
available price for the minority shares in a going-private merger. But, no case has held that a
special committee charged with negotiating on behalf of the minority stockholders did not have an
obligation to obtain the best available transaction. Indeed, the emphasis on trying to recreate the
dynamics of an arm’s-length negation demands that the committee be held to such an obligation.
205. See In re Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 644 n.86 (citing Subramanian, supra note 8, at 5758).
206. Id. From the controlling stockholder’s point of view, the more difficult problem is
presented when the disinterested stockholders are few in number, and in a coordinated effort, the
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III. THE TWO-STEP GOING-PRIVATE PROCEDURE
The alternative means of eliminating the unaffiliated stockholders
from the corporate enterprise is a two-step process. 207 At the first step,
the controlling stockholder makes a tender offer for the shares held by
the unaffiliated stockholders to bring its holdings up to at least 90%.208
The second step is a short-form merger by which the shares held by the
remaining stockholders are cancelled.209 At the end of the two step
process the controlling stockholder has acquired 100% of the
corporation’s equity.210
This Article deals with the judge-made common law of fiduciary
duty as it relates to going-private transactions. Because the second step
of this two-step process, the short-form merger, is governed entirely by
statute, it will be discussed only briefly. Greater attention will be
directed to the first step, the going-private tender offer.
A. The Short-Form Merger
Under Section 253 of the DGCL, a corporation (the “parent
corporation”) that holds at least 90% of the outstanding shares of another
corporation (the “subsidiary corporation”) may cause the subsidiary to
be merged into parent by merely executing and filing with the Delaware
secretary of state a certificate of merger.211 This is called a “short-form”
merger.212 It can be accomplished unilaterally by the board of directors
of the parent corporation.213 It does not require approval by the
subsidiary corporation’s board or its stockholders.214 Indeed, a parent
majority withhold their votes in an effort to capture a premium for themselves. By resisting the
controlling stockholder’s going-private tender offer their numbers may be large enough to prevent
the controlling stockholder from reaching the 90% minimum for the second-step, short-form
merger.
207. See, e.g., In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 435, 437 (Del. Ch. 2002); In
re Aquila, Inc. S’holders Litig., 805 A.2d 184 (Del. Ch. 2002); In re Siliconix, Inc. S’holders Litig.,
No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1990).
208. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 253 (2006). The controlling stockholder would seek to increase
its holdings to at least 90% because that is the minimum amount required to be able to effectuate a
short-form merger under title 8, section 253, which is the second step of the two-step going-private
procedure. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. See also Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 244 (Del. 2000).
212. In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Lititg., 879 A.2d 604, 623 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(indicating that a short-form merger permits the controller “to merge out the remaining stockholders
if the controller’s ownership had increased to 90% through the tender offer”).
213. Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247.
214. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 253; Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247.
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corporation need not even notify the subsidiary or its minority
stockholder until ten days after the merger.215 Because the subsidiary’s
board has no role to play in the transaction, its members have no
opportunity, much less a fiduciary duty, to protect the minority
stockholders.216
A short-form merger is plainly a self-dealing transaction,217 but
Delaware law does not permit minority stockholders to challenge a
short-form merger on the basis of breach of its fiduciary duty of entire
fairness.218
The nature of a short-form merger is not consistent with the
components of a duty of entire fairness.219 The duty of entire fairness
requires two things: “fair dealing” and the payment of a “fair price.”220
The short-form merger statute does not contemplate any “dealing”
between parent and subsidiary.221 Rather, the merger is accomplished
unilaterally by the parent corporation.222 For this reason, the Supreme
Court concluded as a matter of statutory construction that it could not, as
a matter of judge-made fiduciary duty law, impose a “fair dealing”
requirement.223 The only other component of the “entire fairness”
standard that could be challenged would be “fair price.” But, statutory
appraisal is the “exclusive remedy” where the only basis for challenging
a merger is the adequacy of the merger consideration.224 Thus, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that a short-form merger cannot be
challenged for breach of the parent corporation’s duty of entire fairness
and that the exclusive remedy for a minority stockholder who objects to
a short-form merger is statutory appraisal.225

215. § 253; Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247.
216. See generally Subramanian, supra note 8 (explaining that “Delaware corporate law
provides an important role for a target board in a statutory merger but no role for the board in a
tender offer.”)
217. Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247. Indeed, in a short-form merger the parent is not merely on
“both sides of the transaction;” it is on the only side of the transaction. Id. A short-form merger is
not something a parent does with a subsidiary corporation; it is something it does to the subsidiary
corporation and its stockholders. See id.
218. See id. at 248.
219. Id. at 247-48.
220. Id. at 247.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 247-48.
223. Id. at 248.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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B. The Going-Private Tender Offer
Because a short-form merger is not governed by the entire fairness
standard, transactional planners view it as an attractive means of
finishing the process of taking a corporation private. But to do a shortform merger, the parent corporation must hold at least 90% of the
subsidiary’s stock.226 The tender offer is the means by which a parent
corporation may acquire enough shares to satisfy the 90%
requirement.227
A tender offer is “[a]n offer to purchase shares made by a bidder
directly to the stockholders of a target company . . . communicated to the
shareholders by means of newspaper advertisements and (in most cases)
by a general mailing to the entire list of shareholders.”228 The significant
point here is that the offer is made directly from the bidder to the
stockholders.229 It does not pass through, or require, approval by the
corporation’s board.230 The decision to accept or reject the bidder’s
offer is made by the stockholders.231 The corporation’s board had no
formal role to play.232 Indeed, “[t]ender offers are not [even] addressed
by the Delaware General Corporation Law. . . .”233
1. Entire Fairness Is Not Required
Delaware courts have refused to impose a duty of entire fairness on
a controlling stockholder that makes a tender offer for the unaffiliated
shares.234 The rationale is simply this: the controlling stockholder is not
deemed to stand on both sides of the transaction.235 The decision to
accept the terms of the tender offer will be made by the corporation’s
stockholders, not by its board of directors.236 The corporation is not a

226. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 253 (2006).
227. In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 437 (Del. Ch. 2002).
228. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 17 (Foundation Press 2003).
229. See In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 437. Tender offers are regulated by provisions in the
Federal securities laws. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13, 14, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m(d),
(e), 78n(d), (e) (West, Westlaw through 2007 legislation). See generally BAINBRIDGE, Supra note
227, at 277-310.
230. In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 437.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 437-38.
233. Id. at 437.
234. See, e.g., In re Siliconix, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *6
(Del. Ch. June 21, 2001); In re Aquila, Inc. S’holders Litig., 805 A.2d 184 (Del. Ch. 2002).
235. See In re Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *7-8.
236. Id. at *7.
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party to the transaction.237 It issues the stock that is the subject of the
transaction, but the parties to the transaction are the controlling
stockholder (who makes the offer to buy) and the stockholders (who will
decide based on their personal circumstances whether to sell).238 Thus,
the controlling stockholder’s presumed ability to influence the board is
not relevant.239
In the absence of a duty to be “entirely fair,” the controlling
stockholder is free to offer to purchase the shares at any price it
chooses.240 “[C]ourts do not impose any right of the shareholders to
receive a particular price.”241 The controlling stockholder does not have
to duty to offer a “fair” price.242
2. Controlling Stockholder’s Disclosure Duty
A controlling stockholder has access to confidential corporate
information.243 This information gives it an advantage over the public
stockholders.244 Thus, Delaware requires the controlling stockholder
who makes a tender offer for the public shares of its corporation to
disclose all material information.245
3. Controlling Stockholder’s Duty to Avoid Coercion
Delaware courts have long recognized that tender offers can be
coercive.246 The classic example is the “two-tier, front-end loaded”
tender offer addressed by the Court in the famous Unocal case.247 In
that case, the bidder made a cash tender offer for enough shares to bring
its holdings to 51%, and promised that when the tender offer closed, it
would cause the company to enter into a merger in which the remaining
shares would be canceled in exchange for junk bonds with a value that
237. Id.
238. Id. at *6-7.
239. See Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 39 (Del. 1996); see also
Subramanian, supra note 8, at 18 (“The [Solomon] court reasoned that a tender offer was a deal
between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, which involved no conflict of
interest.”).
240. See In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 438 (Del. 2002).
241. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39.
242. In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 438.
243. Id. at 442-43.
244. Id.
245. In re Siliconix, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *9 (Del. Ch.
June 21, 2001).
246. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
247. Id.
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was probably less than the tender offer price.248 The structure of the
transaction forced stockholders to respond favorably to the cash tender
offer to avoid being stuck with dubious junk bonds in the merger.249
In a going-private tender offer, a controlling stockholder has a duty
to structure the offer so that it is not coercive.250 Structural coercion
embraces the traditional idea of a wrongful threat that has the effect of
intimidating stockholders into responding to the tender offer.251 An
example would be a tender offer structured to punish stockholders who
chose to hold their stock rather than tender.252 But, courts do not
consider that kind of “inherent coercion” that troubled Lynch and its
progeny in the context of a going-private merger to be coercive in the
context of a going-private tender offer.253
4. Common Law Duty of the Board of Directors
Although a corporation’s board has no statutory role to play when a
tender offer is made to its shareholders, the board does have a common
law duty.254 In the context of a tender offer launched as part of a hostile
takeover bid, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the board of a
Delaware corporation has a “fundamental duty and obligation to protect
the corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders, from harm
reasonably perceived, irrespective of its source.”255 It is this duty and
power that provides the authority that allows boards of Delaware
corporations to adopt poison pills and other defensive measures to fend
off hostile tender offers.256
This duty to protect stockholders from potentially harmful tender
offers derives from Delaware’s view that directors are “well-positioned
to understand the value of the target company, to compensate for the
disaggregated nature of stockholders by acting as a negotiating and
auctioning proxy for them, and as a bulwark against structural
coercion.”257 Because stockholders are often disaggregated, they are not
able to coordinate a common defense or negotiate a better deal for

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. at 949-51.
Id. at 956.
See In re Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *6.
In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 438 (Del. 2002).
Id.
Id. at 438-39.
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
Id. (emphasis added).
See In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 440.
Id. at 441.
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themselves; therefore, the corporation’s board performs this function.258
The Delaware law regarding the duties of directors faced with a
tender offer for their corporation’s shares can be summarized this way:
under the fiduciary duty principles established in Unocal, directors have
a duty and a right to employ defensive measures to protect their
corporation’s stockholders from a poorly priced tender offer made by an
unsolicited bidder;259 but no case has held that directors have a duty to
protect their corporation’s stockholders from a poorly priced tender offer
made by the controlling stockholder.260
In the latter context,
stockholders are left to fend for themselves.
Despite this obvious incongruity, the Delaware Court of Chancery
has refused to impose a Unocal duty to protect stockholders or directors
of a corporation faced with a tender offer by a controlling stockholder.261
Indeed, the court held that even when the board of a controlled
corporation appoints a special committee of the independent directors to
respond to the controlling stockholder’s tender offer, the committee does
not have a duty to seek the power to employ defensive measures against
the tender offer.262 Deferring to what it referred to as the “sociology of
controlled subsidiaries,”263 the court refused to require the directors to
protect stockholders from tender offers by controlling stockholders
because it would be “awkward” to require directors to take aggressive
action against the stockholder who had nominated and elected them.264
C. The “Pure Resources” Solution
Instead of relying on the corporation’s board of directors to perform
the duties required of them under the Supreme Court’s Unocal decision,
in the Pure Resources Stockholder Litigation case, the court fashioned a
new and highly specific fiduciary duty that controlling stockholders

258. See id.
259. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. Bidders who launch unsolicited offers usually acquire about 5%
of the corporation’s stock before they announce the tender offer. Thus, they, like a controlling
stockholder, are stockholders seeking to buy the shares held by other stockholders. The only
difference is that the unsolicited bidder does not hold enough shares to influence the board.
260. See In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 444. The court noted that there are many “edifying
examples of subsidiary directors courageously taking no position on the merits of offers by a
controlling stockholder.” Id. at 443. The difference between the two circumstances, of course, is
that the unsolicited bidder threatens the directors’ retention of their positions on the board while the
controlling stockholder is the one who nominated and elected the directors to serve on the board.
261. See id. at 421.
262. Id. at 446. This holding assumes that the tender offer is not “coercive.”
263. Id.
264. Id.
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must satisfy in a going-private tender offer.265 This fiduciary duty
requires a controlling stockholder to include three fairly meaningless
terms in the offer:266 (1) the offer must be subject to a non-waivable
condition that a majority of the unaffiliated267 shares tender,268 (2) the
controlling stockholder must promise that if it reaches the 90%
threshold, it will consummate a prompt short-form merger for the same
consideration as that offered in the tender offer,269 and (3) the controlling
stockholder must not make retributive threats.270
In addition, the Court of Chancery held that a “majority stockholder
owes a duty to permit the independent directors of the target board both
free rein and adequate time to react to the tender offer.”271 For its part,
the board of the controlled company must delegate to the independent
directors the duty of fashioning the corporation’s response to the tender
offer.272 The independent directors should hire their own advisors,
provide the unaffiliated stockholders with a recommendation as to the
advisability of the offer, and provide the unaffiliated stockholders
265. See id. at 445. These rules apparently apply only in the context of a going-private tender
offer.
266. Id. at 445. The court does this by building on the controlling stockholder’s duty to
structure the tender offer so that it is “non-coercive.” Id. The court holds that an offer that does not
include these terms will be “coercive” as a matter of law. Id.
267. The court uses the term “majority of the minority,” but the requirement is imposed on a
“controlling stockholder,” and a stockholder who holds less than a majority of the shares may
nonetheless exercise practical control over the corporation. Thus, just as “minority” is the corollary
to “majority,” so “unaffiliated stockholders” would be the corollary to “controlling stockholder.”
268. The duty to include these terms is imposed when the tender offer is launched for the
purpose of bringing the controlling stockholder up to 90% as the first step of a two-step goingprivate transaction. In this context, the obligation to acquire a majority of the unaffiliated shares
would be of consequence only to a controlling stockholder who owns between 80% and 89.999% of
the controlled corporation’s stock. A controlling stockholder that owns less than 80% will always
need to acquire a majority of the unaffiliated shares to bring its holdings up to 90%, and a
controlling stockholder that owns 90% already has sufficient holdings to allow it to effectuate the
short-form merger. Thus, only when a controlling stockholder owns between 80% and 89.999% of
the controlled company’s stock is it possible to acquire less than a majority of the unaffiliated shares
and still reach the 90% threshold for a short-form merger.
269. This term has little, if any, impact on these transactions because a tender offer made as the
first step of a two-step going-private transaction will almost always provide that the acquisition is
for enough shares to bring the controlling stockholder’s holdings up to 90% as a condition of the
tender offer. In other words, in the usual case, the tender offer will not close unless the controlling
stockholder receives enough shares to bring it up to 90%. Subramanian, supra note 8, at 18.
270. This term is of no consequence because the law already prohibits a controlling
stockholder from threatening to use its clout to punish the unaffiliated stockholders who do not bend
to its will. See In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 548 (Del. Ch. 2003). Moreover,
the Delaware courts have long held that coercive tender offers are subject to injunctive relief. See,
e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
271. In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 445.
272. See id.
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adequate information to allow them to make an informed judgment.273
Where these requirements have been satisfied, the court holds that the
tender offer will not be judged under the entire fairness standard.274 But,
if they are not satisfied, the entire fairness standard will apply.275 The
court does not, however, offer a doctrinal justification for the application
of the entire fairness standard to a tender offer.276
The court’s solution essentially trusts stockholders, acting with the
benefit of a recommendation from a special committee, to protect
themselves from an inadequate tender offer.277 The proposition that a
recommendation from a board of directors is sufficient to protect
disaggregated stockholders from a poorly priced tender offer is squarely
contrary to the proposition on which the Unocal decision rests.278
Unocal operated from the premise that a tender offer forces
disaggregated stockholders to deal with a prisoner’s dilemma.279
Without the ability to speak and act as one, they are forced to accept
what is offered.280 By recognizing the board’s right and duty to take
defensive measures and to negotiate the terms under which such
defenses would be removed, the Supreme Court empowered the board to
act as an agent for the disaggregated stockholders to achieve a better
deal.281
D. A Better Way to Analyze Going-Private Tender Offers
The present way of analyzing going-private tender offers begins
with the proposition that a controlling stockholder is not on both sides of
the transaction and thus does not bear a fiduciary duty of entire
fairness.282 The controlling stockholder is said not to straddle both sides
273. Id. Of course the controlling stockholder also has a fiduciary duty to make fair disclosure
to the stockholders and not mislead the stockholders or the independent directors. Id. at 445 n.47.
274. Id. at 445-46.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 444-46.
278. The court candidly acknowledges this inconsistency: “If our law trusts stockholders to
protect themselves in the case of a controlling stockholder tender offer . . . this will obviously be
remembered by advocates in cases involving defenses against similarly non-coercive third-party
tender offers.” Id. at 446 n.50.
279. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985); In Re Pure
Res., 808 A.2d at 442 (“[S]ome view tender offers as creating a prisoner’s dilemma—distorting
choice and creating incentives for stockholders to tender into offers that they believe are inadequate
in order to avoid a worse fate.”).
280. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956.
281. Id. at 957.
282. See In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 441.
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of the transaction because the tender offer is viewed as involving only
the purchase (by the controlling stockholder) and sale (by the
unaffiliated stockholders) of the company’s stock.283 This Article
suggests that, in fact, the controlling stockholder is on both sides of a
going-private tender offer because its power over the corporation’s
board of directors neutralizes the agent that is charged by Delaware
common law with the task of defending the unaffiliated stockholders.
1. The Board’s Duty to Defend
Under Unocal the board owes stockholders a duty to assess whether
a tender offer for their shares poses a threat.284 An offer may pose a
threat where it is structured in a coercive way (“structural coercion”) or
where it is under-priced (“substantive coercion”).285 Where the board
perceives such a threat, it has a duty and a right to protect the
shareholders by taking appropriate defensive measures against the
offer.286 The ability to block a threatening tender offer gives the board
the power to negotiate the removal of the block in exchange for
restructuring the offer to remove the threat. The board’s duty to protect
unaffiliated stockholders, especially disaggregated stockholders from a
poorly priced tender, applies with equal force no matter whether the
offeror is a third-party or a stockholder.287
2. The Controlling Stockholder Is On Both Sides
To the extent a controlling stockholder is able to influence the
board in its role as protector of the unaffiliated stockholders, the
controlling stockholder has taken a position on the other side of the
transaction. The controlling stockholder does not have the ability to
accept the tender offer. But, by influencing the board it has the ability to
prevent the board (in its capacity as the protector of the unaffiliated
stockholders) from saying no to the tender offer. The ability to cause a
board not to say “no” to a tender offer does just as much to place the
controlling stockholder “on both sides of the transaction” as its ability to
cause the board to say “yes” to a merger.
By disarming the stockholders’ defenders, a controlling stockholder
283. In re Siliconix, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at * 7 (Del.
Ch. June 21, 2001).
284. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
285. See In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 441.
286. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
287. Id.
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straddles both sides of the transaction and thus takes on a duty to assure
that the structure and price of the tender offer are entirely fair to the
unaffiliated stockholders. Seen in this light, and following traditional
principles governing the fiduciary duties of controlling stockholders, a
going-private tender offer should be subject to entire fairness review
unless the controlling stockholder takes affirmative steps to neutralize its
influence over the corporation’s board of directors. The obvious way to
do this would be to cause the corporation’s board to appoint a special
committee of independent directors to review the tender offer and to
empower the committee to take such actions (including defensive
actions) as it deems appropriate to serve the best interests of the
unaffiliated stockholders.
3. Special Committee of Independent Directors
Where the corporation appoints a special committee of independent
directors to respond to the tender offer and empowers these directors to
take such defensive measures as they deem appropriate to protect the
unaffiliated stockholders, it can be said that the controlling stockholder
has been removed from the other side of the deal. The role of guardian
for the unaffiliated stockholders has been returned to independent and
powerful protectors. In this circumstance, the controlling stockholder is
like any other offeror, except it presumably has an informational
advantage because of its access to inside information.
This
informational advantage requires the controlling stockholder to make
full disclosure to the corporation’s board and its stockholders. Where
these criteria are satisfied, there would be no grounds to support the
imposition of a fiduciary duty of entire fairness on the controlling
stockholder. And the decision of the independent committee would be
entitled to the favorable presumptions of the business judgment rule,
viewed with heightened scrutiny under the Unocal standard.
Viewed this way, the duty of protecting the unaffiliated
stockholders would rest with the empowered independent directors.
They would have duty to protect unaffiliated stockholders from poorly
priced offers.
IV. CONCLUSION
The revisions recommended by this Article in the way goingprivate mergers and going-private tender offers are analyzed would
harmonize the standards by which these functionally identical
transactions are reviewed by courts.
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In both instances, the analysis would begin with the board of
directors and would be conducted under the procedural and substantive
aspects of the business judgment rule. In both cases, the corporation’s
board should delegate the job of negotiation and decision-making to a
special committee of independent directors.288 Failure to do so would
support the inference that the powerful stockholder had retained its
presumed control over the company’s side of the transaction. In this
event, the powerful stockholder would be deemed to be a controlling
stockholder who was on both sides of the transaction. Accordingly, the
transaction (going-private merger or going-private tender offer) would
be reviewed under the entire fairness standard with the proponents of the
transaction bearing the burden of proof.
Alternatively, where the negotiation and decision-making function
is delegated to a special committee of independent directors, the
committee’s actions and decisions would be reviewed under the business
judgment rule. Consistent with the procedural aspects of the business
judgment rule, a complaint challenging the committee’s actions or
decisions would be subject to a motion to dismiss unless the plaintiff
could meet its burden of pleading with particularity (1) facts that showed
that the committee had not been given the power and resources to enable
it to negotiate effectively on behalf of the unaffiliated stockholders
(including, in the context of a going-private tender offer, the power to
defend them when necessary), or (2) facts that called into question the
independence, diligence, or good faith of the members of the committee.
If the plaintiff is able to shoulder this burden as to the first point, the
court would conclude that the powerful stockholder remained a
“controlling stockholder.” If the plaintiff proves facts that bear on the
second point, then the plaintiff would have rebutted the favorable
presumptions of the business judgment rule. In either event, the
proponents of the transaction (going-private merger or tender offer)
would have the burden of proving that it was entirely fair.
In the case of the going-private merger, the committee would
decide whether the merger was in the best interests of the unaffiliated
stockholders. Its fiduciary duties to the unaffiliated stockholders would
require it to negotiate to give them a voice by requiring that the merger
be approved by an absolute majority of their number.
In the case of the going-private tender offer, the committee would

288. Consistent with other areas of the law, the mere fact that a majority of the corporation’s
stock is held by a single stockholder or an identifiable group would not, standing alone, be sufficient
to impugn the directors’ independence.
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be charged with responsibility of determining whether the offer was
structurally or substantively coercive. In either event the committee
would have a Unocal duty to take appropriate measures to protect the
stockholders.289 The nature of these defensive measures would be a
matter to be decided by the committee based on the nature of the threat
and the needs of the unaffiliated stockholders.290 For example, where
the unaffiliated stockholders are sophisticated and able to coordinate
their response, the committee might be able to meet this obligation by
merely recommending that they reject the offer. Where the unaffiliated
stockholders are numerous and disaggregated, the committee might need
to implement stronger defensive measures (such as a poison pill) to
block the offer. The decision as to what defense is appropriate should be
left to the business judgment of the committee. A challenge to the
committee’s decision would be subject to the Unocal standard of
review.291
Thus, the judicial standard by which the two types of transactions
would be reviewed becomes identical. In both instances the business
decision would be made by independent directors, not judges.

289. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-56.
290. Id. at 955.
291. Because of the presence of a controlling stockholder, these cases differ from takeover bids
by third-parties where the corporation’s managers can seek offers from others in the market for
corporate control. Accordingly, Unocal would require members of the committee to explain why
they blocked the offer.
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